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Danger for the Endangered Species Act?:
Catron County Board of Commissioners,
New Mexico v. United States Fish and
Wildlife Service
RICHARD W. BERTELSON, III*
INTRODUCTION
In Catron County Board of Commissioners, New Mexico v. United
States Fish and Wildlife Service,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the Secretary of Interior must prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) in compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)2 before designating areas as "critical
habitat" for endangered species under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).' At first glance, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Catron appears
to depart significantly from the line of previous federal cases question-
ing the applicability of NEPA to actions under the ESA. However,
upon further examination, the effect of the holding is relatively narrow
in scope, since it applies only to federal environmental agencies when
actions they undertake are major federal actions which adversely affect
the quality of the human environment 4 Ultimately, the most significant
result of the Tenth Circuit's decision may be to encourage all federal
environmental agencies to prepare an EIS prior to undertaking any
project intended to benefit the environment-a result harboring both
negative and positive implications for federal environmental policy.
Despite the apparent simplicity of its decision that the procedures
of NEPA apply to some actions under the ESA, the overall effect of
* Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, J.D., Class
of 1998, University of Kentucky; M.P.A. 1997, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1992, Western
Kentucky University.
' Catron County Board of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429 (10th Cir. 1996).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(d) (1994).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994).
4 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1439.
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Catron may be nullified by the procedural construction of the ESA. The
court's creative approach in granting the plaintiffs standing to sue in this
case may also limit application of the holding in jurisdictions outside the
Tenth Circuit. While the court examined the legislative record to
determine whether Congress intended the ESA to trigger the require-
ments of NEPA,5 its inquiry left unanswered the question of whether
Congress actually intended for NEPA to apply to federal environmental
agencies.
If interpreted too broadly, the Catron decision could significantly
affect the Secretary of the Interior's ability to achieve the primary goal
of the ESA.6 The Catron court did not conclude that all designations of
critical habitat should be deemed "major federal actions" for the
purposes of NEPA.7 The court ruled only that under extraordinary
circumstances, such as those in Catron where the designation of critical
habitat could result in an actual physical injury to the human environ-
ment, the agency designating the critical habitat must fulfill the
obligations of NEPA.8
From an environmental perspective, however, the Catron court's
decision lacks an adequate balancing test between human property
interests and the interest of preventing the extinction of critically
endangered species.9 Under the Catron decision, the Secretary of the
Interior (Secretary) cannot take any action to prevent the extinction of
an endangered species until he completes the preparation, notice and
comment proceedings, and revision of a NEPA environmental assess-
ment (EA).1" Such delays could lead to the unnecessary loss of some
species of plants or animals forever, which could result in adverse, far-
reaching, and irreversible ramifications for the environment and for the
interrelated fitness of human ecological health."
5 Id.
6 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) ("to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved.").
Catron, 75 F.3d at 1439.
8 Id.
9 Id.
1o Id. ("When the environmental ramifications of such designations are unknown, we believe
that Congress intends that the Secretary prepare an EA ... ").
" For example, while the threatened extinction of the Northern Spotted Owl certainly
endangered the continued existence of that one species of bird, the entire ecosystem within the
owl's habitat was also threatened. The Spotted Owl holds a controlling or "keystone" position
among the rest of the species in the food web of its ecosystem. The disappearance of the owl would
lead to an overpopulation of the smaller animals on which it feeds. This would, in turn, lead to the
exhaustion of their food supplies and the eventual disappearance of other plants and animals that
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I. THE CATRONCASE HISTORY
The Catron case involved a dispute between the Secretary of the
Interior and the County Commission of Catron County, New Mexico. I
In 1985, the Secretary proposed listing two species of fish, the loach
minnow and spikedace, as endangered species and establishing critical
habitat areas for them in the Gila River system) 3 Portions of the river
system run through Catron County. 4 In 1986, the Secretary promul-
gated regulations listing both fish as threatened, but he delayed
designating critical habitat for the two species for a year. 5 In delaying
his final decision to designate the areas of critical habitat, the Secretary
cited his primary concern as "the complexity of the economic analysis
that must accompany the final rule designating critical habitats and the
large number of comments and data received on these habitats."'
16
On April 7, 1994, after nearly eight years of subsequent delays and
rescheduling, the Secretary issued notice of final designation of critical
habitat for the spikedace and loach minnow along the Gila River system
in Catron County and elsewhere throughout New Mexico and Arizona. 7
Some seventy-four miles of the Gila, San Francisco and Tularosa rivers
and the Dry Blue Creek in Catron County were affected by this
designation) 8 Later that month Catron County filed a motion to enjoin
the Secretary from enforcing the critical habitat designation. 9
The County Board of Commissioners claimed that the Secretary
had failed to prepare an EA in accordance with the provisions of
NEPA.2" They asserted that the Secretary's designation of the critical
habitat area would force Catron County to abandon flood control
operations along the Gila River system, which would cause flood
depend upon those species. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT
121 (Penguin Books 1992).
" Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv.,
75 F.3d 1429, 1432-33 (10th Cir. 1996).
13 Id. at 1432 (citing to 50 Fed. Reg, 25,380 (Loach Minnow), 25,390 (Spike Dace) (1985)).
" Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for
the Spike Dace, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,769 at 23,770 (1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
" Carron, 75 F.3d at 1432.
" 51 Fed. Reg. 23,769 at 23, 771.
7 Carron, 75 F. 3d at 1433.
IS Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the
Threatened Loach Minnow, 59 Fed.Reg. 10,898 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
'1 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1433.
2u Id.
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damage to land owned by the county.2 In October 1994, the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico found that the
Secretary had not complied with NEPA by failing to prepare an EA
before designating critical habitat for the spikedace and loach minnow
under the applicable provisions of the ESA.22 Based on this finding, the
court granted the county's motion for partial summary judgment and
granted injunctive relief against the Secretary to prevent him from
designating the area as critical habitat.23
In response to the district court's ruling, the Secretary then sought,
and was granted, an interlocutory appeal before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.24 The court agreed with the district
court and sustained both the district court's grant of injunctive relief in
favor of Catron County and the district court's ruling that the Secretary
must comply with NEPA when designating critical habitat under the
ESA if such action is a "major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. 25
This Comment first examines the Catron court's affirmation of the
county's standing to sue the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, reviewing
the county's assertion of injury-in-fact, and examining the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of relevant sections of the ESA. Next, the
Comment looks at the general applicability of NEPA to actions of the
Department of the Interior (DOI) under the ESA and the required
interaction, under ESA § 1536, between the DOI and other federal
agencies. Finally, the Comment discusses the long term significance of
the Catron decision and the possible outcome of an appeal before the
United States Supreme Court.
A. Standing
In Sierra Club v. Morton26 the Supreme Court defined "standing
to sue" to mean that "[the plaintiff] party has sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy."'27 Twenty years later in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,28
the Court, citing Sierra Club v. Morton, set down three elements,
establishing the absolute minimum constitutional requirements for a




24 Id. at 1432.
25 Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv, 75
F.3d 1429, 1439 (10th Cir. 1996).
26 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
27 Id. at 731-32.
28 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
2I ld. at 560.
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First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,"' Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be "fairly... trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to




The Catron court endorsed the Defenders of Wildlife standing test and
applied the test to the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's claims.3
The Catron court's first task in establishing plaintiff standing was
to determine whether the plaintiff had suffered an injury in fact or
whether the plaintiff would likely suffer some injury in fact in the near
future as a result of the Secretary's actions. From the facts of the case
it appeared that the plaintiff county based its claim of "injury in fact"
on an injury that it had not yet suffered, nor appeared certain to suffer
in the foreseeable future.32 This runs counter to the first two require-
ments of standing outlined by the Defenders of Wildlife Court, outlined
supra.33 In Warth v. Seldin,34 the Court explained that this standard of
proof must apply to allegations of injury, because, "absent the necessary
allegations of demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no
confidence of a real need to exercise the power of judicial review or that
relief can be framed no (broader) than required by the precise facts to
which the court's ruling would be applied.""
In Catron, the plaintiff claimed that the designation of critical
habitat would prevent the government from operating flood control
measures along the Gila River system. This in turn, they claimed,
would lead to flooding which would damage a large portion of property
owned by the county, such as the fairgrounds, bridges, and several
o Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
3 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1433 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 at 559 ("[t]he party
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing an actual or imminent injury that is
concrete and particularized rather than conjectural or hypothetical; a causal connection that is
'fairly traceable' to the conduct complained of; and a likelihood of redressability in the event of a
favorable decision.")).
3 Id. at 1433.
-3 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 at 559 (emphasis added).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
3' Id. at 508.
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county roads.36 The court accepted the plaintiff's allegations at face
value, and found the alleged injury to be an "injury in fact."37 In
support of this contention, the court cited §1536(a)(2) of the ESA,
which reads in pertinent part:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this
section referred to as an "agency action") is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined
by the 'Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with
affected States, to be critical, unless such agency has been
granted an exemption for such action by the Committee
pursuant to subsection (h) of this section .... 38
The Catron court interpreted this language in § 1536 to automati-
cally prohibit all further federal actions within an area whenever the
Secretary designates that area as critical habitat. 39 The court stated that
"contrary to the suggestion of the Secretary.. .[designation of an area
as critical habitat] effectively prohibits all subsequent federal or
federally funded or directed action likely to destroy or disrupt the
habitat."4 However, the court cited no cases tried within the Tenth
Circuit or any other jurisdiction that lend support to this novel interpre-
tation of the language of 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
The court did not explain its conclusion that § 1536(a)(2)
effectively prohibits all federal activity within a critical habitat area,
other than to cite the statute itself.4" This is perhaps the weakest link in
the court's chain of reasoning. Interpreted in a more straightforward
manner, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) gives the Secretary discretion to
exclude a federal project from the critical habitat area. The statute does
not, however, automatically exclude all federal or federally-funded
projects from the area, nor does it require the Secretary to declare a
moratorium on all present and future projects in the area.42 A federal
36 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1433 (citing to 50 Fed. Reg. 25,380 (Loach Minnow), 25,390 (Spike
Dace) (1985)).
37 id.
3, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
31 Catron, 75 F.3d 1429 at 1437 ("The designation of critical habitat effectively prohibits
all subsequent federal or federally funded or directed actions likely to affect the habitat.").
40 Id. at 1434.
41 Id.
42 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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agency that wants to authorize, fund or carry out a project in the critical
habitat area may still do so.43 However, section 1536(a)(2) requires the
agency to consult with the Secretary in order to modify the project to
insure that it will not threaten the survival of the endangered species or
destroy or adversely modify its habitat."
The Secretary had made no statement or other indication to the
effect that he intended to prohibit all flood control projects in Catron
County after designating the critical habitat area. Therefore, the
plaintiff county had no affirmative evidence to support its contention
that the injuries complained of would likely happen. Thus, under the
second part of the Defenders of Wildlife standing test, the plaintiff could
not affirmatively prove that the injuries in its complaint were either
"concrete" or "particularized." '4 Therefore, the plaintiff failed the
Supreme Court's standing test, and the Tenth Circuit should have
dismissed the plaintiffs claims, because the Defenders of Wildlife Court
asserted that the burden of establishing these factors lies with the party
seeking federal jurisdiction.'
The Catron court failed to address an additional concern that may
have altered the standard of proof in the case. The cause of the plaintiff
county's asserted injury would arise only from the interaction of the
Secretary and an unnamed federal agency not present in the Catron
case. In a suit challenging the legality of a government action or
inaction, if the alleged injury arises from the government's allegedly
illegal regulation of another party, the court may require the plaintiff to
produce more substantial evidence to demonstrate that the offending
government action caused his injury or that action by the court will
redress his alleged injury." The Court in Warth explained that if a
defendant in a civil case is only indirectly to blame for the plaintiff's
claimed injury the court will not preclude the plaintiff from seeking
redress, but the court may demand that the plaintiff produce more
evidence to demonstrate that he has standing to sue.S The court in
Catron should have applied this more difficult standard of proof to the
county's claims of injury, because according to the relevant sections of
the ESA, the flood damage would only result from a failure of the
Secretary of Interior to develop a mitigation agreement with the federal
43 Id.
" d.
4s Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
46 Id. at 561.
I d. at 562.
4' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) ("The indirectness of the injury does not
necessarily deprive the person harmed of standing to vindicate his rights. But it may make it
substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement[s] of Art. III ...") (citation omitted).
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agency that operates the flood control measures in the county.49
Under ESA § 1536(a)(2), once the Secretary consults with the
federal agency in charge of flood control for Catron County, he may
recommend that no changes be made to the Catron County flood control
measures.5" Working with the Army Corps of Engineers, the Secretary
might be able to develop a plan which would maintain flood protection
for the county's property while still protecting the endangered fish and
their habitat."' Since all federal agencies depend upon Congress for
funding, and congressional funding often hinges upon public support of
the agency in question, no federal agency can expect to withstand the
political ramifications of an agency action that adversely affects the
lives of hundreds or thousands of citizens. Such political considerations
would necessarily force the Secretary to balance the environmental and
economic interests of the citizens with the interest of the federal
government in protecting the endangered species before making a
decision to prevent Catron County from operating any flood control
measures along the Gila River system. The Tenth Circuit could have
served the public interest in a better way by allowing the Secretary to
engage in this logical thought process before imposing its own judicial
solution.
An added layer of procedure within the ESA provides a final
administrative remedy beyond the final agency action of designating a
critical habitat area. Even if the Secretary prohibits a federal agency
from proceeding with a planned action within a critical habitat area, the
federal agency may appeal the Secretary's decision to another authority
under the ESA. 2 In the 1978 ESA amendments, Congress created the
Endangered Species Committee (ESC). 3 The ESC may hear and decide
appeals from decisions of the Secretary regarding federal projects in
critical habitat areas through a quasi-judicial process.5 4 The ESC's
members include the Secretary of the Interior as chair, the Secretary of
the Army (as many federal construction projects are carried out by the
Army Corps of Engineers), the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and a presidentially-
appointed representative from each affected State.55 Subsection (h) of
41 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1996).
so 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (1996).
' 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1996).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(8)-(10).
5 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)(A)-(G) and (5)(B).
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ESA § 1536 allows the ESC to grant a federal agency an exemption
from consulting with the Secretary of Interior if:
there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action; the benefits of such action clearly outweigh
the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with
conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such action
is in thepublic interest; the action is of regional or national
significance; and neither the Federal agency concerned nor
the exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretriev-
able commitment of resources prohibited by subsection (d)
of this section; and it establishes such reasonable mitigation
and enhancement measures, including, but not limited to, live
propagation, transplantation, and habitat acquisition and
improvement, as are necessary and appropriate to minimize
the adverse effects of the agency action upon the endangered
species, threatened species, or critical habitat concerned.56
While the Secretary of Interior may not reverse a final decision of
the Committee, 5" this provision confirms that all final decisions of the
Committee are subject to judicial review.58 It might be argued,
therefore, that Congress contemplated that the ESC's final decision
would constitute the "final agency action" with regard to designations
of critical habitat. If this was Congress' intent, then the case in Catron
had not reached finality, and therefore, the Tenth Circuit should have
overturned the lower court's decision.
In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California,59 the U.S. Supreme
Court found that judicial intervention in cases where a final agency
action has not taken place denies the agency the opportunity to correct
its own mistakes.' The Court also stated that premature judicial
interference leads to piecemeal review and wasted judicial
resources-the same legal theory which governs interlocutory appeals.
61
Finally, the Court found that § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)62 provides an adequate remedy to a person aggrieved by an
56 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1) (emphasis added).
" 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(B) ("Any final determination by the Committee under this
subsection shall be considered final agency action for purposes of chapter 7 of title 5.").
" 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) ("Any person, as defined by section 1532(13) of this title, may obtain
judicial review ... of any decision of the Endangered Species Committee under subsection (h) of
this section....").
" FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
10 Id. at 242.
61 Id.
'" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706(1994).
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agency's actions by allowing a court to "hold unlawful and set aside
agency action ... found to be ... without observance of procedure
required by law.
63
B. Applying The National Environmental Policy Act To Federal
Actions Under the Endangered Species Act
A federal agency may be excused from the requirements of NEPA
for two specific reasons. An agency may be excused from complying
with NEPA if, by complying, the agency would be forced to violate its
own enabling statute.' A federal agency may also be excused from
preparing an EIS under NEPA if the agency action requires that the
agency make inquiries and assessments that essentially replace or
duplicate the functions of the NEPA process.6
1. Statutory Conflicts
In Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass 'nj the Court
found that a thirty-day time limit of the Interstate Land Sales Disclosure
Act (Disclosure Act 6 effectively precluded the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) from developing an EIS prior to
fulfilling his duties under the Disclosure Act.6" The Court found that
even the most experienced agency staff may need up to five months to
prepare the first draft of even the most simple EIS.69 Therefore, the
Court declared that "where a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory
authority exists, NEPA must give way."' The Court noted that it was
virtually "inconceivable" that an EIS could be drafted, circulated,
commented upon, and then reviewed and revised within thirty days.7'
Three years prior to Flint Ridge, the Court established that NEPA
holds a secondary status with regard to statutory authorizations. In
United States v. SCRAP, 2 the Court found that when a statutory conflict
with the agency's authorizing legislation prohibits or makes compliance
63 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 245 (citation omitted).
14 Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976).
65 Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 698
(1996); Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829(6th Cir. 1981); Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d
776 (9th Cir. 1986).
6 Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20.
68 Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788.
6 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id at 788-91.




with NEPA impossible, the agency is excused from complying with
NEPA.73 The Court relied in part on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,74 a
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia two years prior to its decision in SCRAP.5 The court in
Calvert Cliffs declared that "the [NEPA] Section 102 duties are not
inherently flexible. They must be complied with to the fullest extent,
unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority.
7 6
The Catron court found that the Secretary did not assert the same
type of conflict-of-statutes argument the HUD Secretary asserted in
Flint Ridge. 7 Rathei, the Secretary in Catron argued that the "similar-
ity of the statutes' procedures, together with congressional failure to
respond to judicial and executive announcements of NEPA noncompli-
ance, evidence Congress' implicit intent to 'displace NEPA's procedural
and informational requirements."' 78 Therefore, the Catron court did not
directly address the Flint Ridge question. However, the conflict-of-
statutes question becomes more relevant when considering the applica-
bility of NEPA to the ESA. A time-related conflict effectively equates
this concern with the HUD Secretary's argument in Flint Ridge. Under
the ESA, the Secretary of Interior has the option to exclude certain areas
from designation as critical habitat if he finds "that the benefits of such
exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such areas as part of the
critical habitat. . . ,,7' However, he may not exclude any part of the
critical habitat if he determines that "the failure to designate such area
as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species
concerned." 0 This language indicates that Congress gave the Secretary
discretion to consider the costs and benefits of designating a particular
area as critical habitat, but Congress expressly prohibited him from
considering such issues when a species is in danger of becoming
extinct." This is both logical and reasonable since the Secretary may
change the designation if, after a period of time, the species is restored
to non-endangered status.82 The same corrective action cannot bring a
" Id. at 671 ("NEPA must give way .... [The Act] was not intended to repeal by
implication any other statute.").
7 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (1971).
"' SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 669.
76 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115 (emphasis added).
"' Caron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N. M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv, 75 F.3d
1429, 1436-37 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1437 (citation omitted).
7' 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1996).
Id.
" Id.
8 16U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B) (1996).
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species back from extinction.
A species threatened with immediate extinction may not be able to
survive for the amount of time required to prepare an EIS. To allow a
species to become extinct while preparing an EIS that (under the
statutory construction of the ESA) the Secretary could not consider,
would undermine the special protection Congress intended to provide
such critically threatened species in § 1533(b)(2) of the ESA. 3 In
Catron, the Secretary did not assert that either the spikedace or loach
minnow were in immediate danger 2of becoming extinct. However, if
other courts-adopting Catron as precedent-decide that the Secretary
should comply with NEPA whenever he designates critical habitat, the
added time and procedural requirements may prevent the Secretary from
taking more immediate steps to prevent the nation's most endangered
species from becoming extinct.
2. Functional Equivalence
Agencies may also be excused from NEPA compliance when the
agency action is undertaken "subject to rules and regulations that
essentially duplicate the NEPA inquiry."" The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit examined this form of NEPA exemption in the
1986 case of Merrell v. Thomas. 5 In its decision the court ruled that
Congress intended for the requirements of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)8 6 to replace of the require-
ments of NEPA.8 7 When Congress amended FIFRA in 1972, NEPA had
been in effect for two years. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated that, "Congress gave no indication that it thought NEPA would
apply. Instead, Congress created a registration procedure within FIFRA
to ensure consideration of environmental impact-a procedure that
apparently made NEPA superfluous."88  The FIFRA registration
procedure required the EPA Administrator to place a notice in the
Federal Register; "to act 'as expeditiously as possible' in making a
decision to approve or disapprove the pesticide, and to make informa-
tion available to the public within thirty days of his decision.89
In contrast to the FIFRA registration requirements, the ESA
requires the Secretary to consider comments from interested parties
83 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
"4 Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1996).
" Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
" 7U.S.C.§§ 136-136y(1994).





prior to listing a species as endangered or designating critical habitat."
Section 1533(b)(5) of the ESA requires the Secretary to provide notice
to all states, and all jurisdictions within those states, where the species
are believed to exist.9' The states and all affected jurisdictions are then
allowed to comment on the proposed listing, and upon petition of any
interested party the Secretary must hold a public hearing on the
proposed listing in order to allow affected parties to express their
concerns in person.92 The ESA also provides that the Secretary may
take as long as ninety days-sixty days longer than the FIFRA
regulations-before making a final determination to list the species as
endangered or to designate critical habitat.93
The Merrell court found that the registration requirements of
FIFRA served essentially the same purpose as the EA process of NEPA,
and, therefore, an EA was unnecessary.9 4 However, the Catron court
did not adapt the Merrell decision to its case. The Catron court agreed
with the Secretary's contention that the habitat designation procedures
under the ESA duplicate some of the requirements of NEPA.95 The
court stated that, "it is clear that the provisions of the ESA governing
the designation of critical habitat instruct the Secretary to follow
procedures that to some extent parallel and perhaps overlap the
requirements imposed by NEPA."' However, the court found that the
ESA requirements only partially fulfilled the primary purposes of
NEPA.97
A year before the Catron decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit addressed an identical conflict between the requirements
of NEPA and the Secretary of Interior's duties under the ESA in
Douglas County v. Babbitt.9" In Douglas County, the Secretary sought
to designate some 11 million acres of federal lands in Oregon as critical
habit for the endangered spotted owl.9 In the notice of his intent to
designate the critical habitat area, the Secretary declared that, according
to a 1983 policy promulgated by the Department of Interior, he was not
90 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5).
" Id. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii).
9' Id. §1533(b)(5)(A)-(E).
"' Id. § 1533(b)(5)(A).
9 Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986).
9' Catron County Bd. ofComm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429, 1437 (10th Cir. 1996).
96 Id.
9' Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) ('"[NEPA's purpose
is] to inject environmental consideration into the federal agency's decision making ... and inform
the public that the agency has considered the environment.")).
" Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 698
(1996).
" id. at 1498.
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required to follow NEPA when designating critical habit under ESA. 3
The Secretary based his assertion on a policy founded on both the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus,' and a
letter '02 from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) urging the
Secretary to cease preparing EISs in conjunction with designations of
critical habitat.0 3
In Pacific Legal Foundation the Sixth Circuit held that NEPA was
not applicable to the Secretary's listing of seven species of mussels as
endangered because:
First, filing an impact statement does not and cannot serve
the purposes of the Endangered Species Act .... Second.
.NEPA is primarily a procedural statute to insure that an
agency considers the environmental impact [of its actions].
... Third, the Secretary's action in listing species as endan-
gered or threatened furthers the purposes of NEPA even
though no impact statement is filed."°
While the Catron court recognized the Pacific Legal Foundation
decision as valid in some cases, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the case
from the facts in Catron because the plaintiffs in Pacific Legal
Foundation claimed that their injuries resulted from the Secretary's act
of listing the endangered species without first preparing an EA. In
Catron, the plaintiff county claimed that its injury would arise from the
Secretary's failure to prepare an EA prior to designating critical
habitat.'5 This distinction between the two actions of the Secretary is
a subtle one since the Secretary's duty to designate critical habitat is
nondiscretionary under § 1533(a)(3) of the ESA.'0 6 Therefore, he must
always perform both. The scope of comment on this portion of the
Catron decision is limited, since the court did not explain its reasons for
its belief that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Pacific Legal Foundation
should not extend to both the listing of species and to the designation of
I Id.
03 Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
0o Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Preparation of Environmental
Assessments for Listing Actions Under the Endangered Species Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
303 Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N. M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996).
"o Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 835-37.
30 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1438.
"o 16 U.S.C. § 1533(3)(A) ("The Secretary ... shall concurrently with making a
determination ... that a species is an endangered species or a threatened species, designate any




In its 1983 letter to the Secretary of Interior, the CEQ directed the
Secretary to stop preparing an EIS when listing endangered species or
designating critical habitat.'08 According to the Supreme Court in
Andrus v. Sierra Club, the CEQ's "interpretation of NEPA is entitled to
substantial deference."'" However, the Catron court found the CEQ
letter "unpersuasive" because Congress did not take the opportunity five
years later to incorporate the CEQ's interpretation (or the subsequent
Department of Interior policy) into the ESA when it amended § 1533 in
1988. 'o
The Douglas County court upheld the Secretary's determination
that the procedures he is required to follow in designating critical habitat
under the ESA effectively displace the environmental assessment
processes of NEPA."' The court found that Congress intended for the
procedures of the ESA to displace the NEPA requirements. "12 However,
the Tenth Circuit refused to apply the Douglas County holding to the
Catron case. Rejecting the Secretary's view that the provisions of the
ESA and NEPA are mutually exclusive, the court found that "compli-
ance with NEPA will further the goals of the ESA." 3  The court
asserted that the process of preparing an EIS will ensure that the
Secretary fulfills the goals of ESA while complying with NEPA "'to the
fullest extent possible.""' 4 The court also believed that forcing the
Secretary to prepare an EIS for designations of critical habitat would
help to preclude unnecessary judicial review."' The court stated that,
"appellants' theory would cast the judiciary as the final arbiter of what
federal actions protect or enhance the environment, a role for the which
the courts are not suited."' 6 This argument is plausible because the
information accumulated by the Secretary in producing an EA would
serve as "sufficient evidence" for purposes of § 706(2)(E) of the APA,
and would likely prevent a court from setting aside a critical habitat
7 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1439 ("We conclude that the legislative history does not, as Appellants
contend, indicate congressional endorsement of the Secretary's announcement in the Federal
Register of NEPA noncompliance or silent acquiescence in applying and extending the holding of
Pacific Legal Foundation to designations of critical habitat.").
'o' Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
698 (1996).
" Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
"0 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1438-39.
Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1507.
Id. at 1507-08 ( "NEPA does not apply to actions that do not change the physical
environment, and to apply NEPA to the ESA would further the purposes of neither statute.").
"t Catron, 75 F.3d at 1436.
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designation based on such evidence.'" 7
In Catron, the Department of Interior argued that Congress' failure
to take legislative action to reverse the Secretary's 1983 policy
evidenced congressional approval of the policy and supported the
Secretary's refusal to prepare an EIS."8 Specifically, the Secretary
argued that when Congress undertook the 1988 amendments to the ESA,
it could have amended § 1533 to require the Secretary to perform an EIS
prior to designating critical habitat. "9 However, Congress chose not to
address the issue. Therefore, the Secretary believed Congress' silence
regarding the 1983 policy indicated agreement with, and continued
support of, the policy.2 '
The Catron court disagreed with the Secretary's theory that
Congress' silence indicated support of the 1983 policy, stating that, "the
failure to revise, unaccompanied by any evidence of congressional
awareness of the interpretation, is not persuasive evidence.""' The
court agreed that Congress had amended parts of§ 1533 in 1988, but it
felt that since Congress did not specifically address the critical habitat
provisions in § 1533 it could not be deemed to have given its consider-
ation or any type of silent approval to the policy."2 While it may be
argued that Congress intentionally remained silent as to the critical
habitat provisions in order to maintain the Department of Interior's
interpretation of its duties under NEPA, the Catron court demanded
some tangible evidence that at least some members of Congress
considered the effect of not amending them to conform with the
Department of Interior's policy and the CEQ directive."' The court
stated that, "a proponent of congressional acquiescence ... bears the
burden of showing 'abundant evidence that Congress both contemplated
and authorized' the previous non-congressional interpretation in which
it now finds acquiescence."' 24 The court then proceeded to examine the
legislative history of the ESA to determine whether Congress intended
NEPA to apply to federal actions under the ESA."' The court found
that, "Congress apparently intended the Secretary in some cases to
prepare an impact statement when designating critical habitat under the
"t 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).






"I Catron, 75 F.3d at 1438 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 847 (1986)).
25" Id. at 1439.
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In fact, Congress had considered an amendment to § 1533 during
the 1978 ESA Amendment debates.'27 On July 19, 1978, Senator
McClure of Idaho introduced an amendment"2 8 that would have added
a new section to the ESA, specifically defining designations of critical
habitat as "major federal actions" for the purposes of NEPA."9 In his
supporting statement, Senator McClure indicated that he was concerned
with what he perceived as an inherent inflexibility in the procedural
requirements of the ESA.'13
Senator Wallop of Wyoming objected to McClure's amendment
on grounds that it would force the Secretary to perform an EIS when
designating any area of critical habitat."' This concern aside, Senator
Wallop apparently agreed with Senator McClure's contention that an
EIS should be prepared before the Secretary designates at least some
areas as critical habitat.12 He also concurred with Senator McClure's
remarks that each case should be judged individually on its own
particular facts. "I Senator McClure withdrew his amendment, yet the
Catron court deemed this exchange between Senators McClure and
Wallop as evidence that, "Congress contemplated and intended
secretarial compliance with NEPA when designating habitat under
ESA."" 4 However, if other Senators present during the debate deemed
the question raised by Senator McClure worthy of an affirmative rule,
why did they not take the opportunity to change the statute at that time?
Senator McClure could have revised his amendment to address
Senator Wallop's concerns had he felt it necessary. The fact that the
question was considered and withdrawn would seem, more logically, to
126 Id.
121 124 CONG. REc. 21,588 (1978).
2' That amendment stated in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [Endangered Species] Act or any other
law, an action taken by any Federal department or agency involving the designation
of any areas as critical habitats ... shall be deemed to be a major federal action
significantly impacting the human environment requiring the filing of an environmen-
tal impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 .... Id.
121 Id. (statement of the Presiding Officer).
130 124 CONG. REc. 21,589 (1978) (statement of Senator McClure) ("But I do believe that the
agency that makes the designation ... must ultimately be able to bear the burden of inquiry that
they have considered not just the welfare of the endangered species, but the relative value of that
minute subcategory with overriding considerations, if, indeed, they exist.").
'3' Id (statement of Senator Wallop) ("It is possible that there will be many that will not be
major Federal actions.").
2 Id. (statement of Senator Wallop).
'3' Id. (statement of Senator Wallop) ("It would be a determination for the courts to make as
to whether or not anything that we could determine in any given designation would be a major
Federal action .... The act is silent. It neither encourages nor prohibits an EIS requirement.").
"4 Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N. M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429, 1439 (10th Cir. 1996).
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indicate that Congress rejected the contention that NEPA applies to
designations of critical habitat. In Pacific Legal Foundation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the exchange
between Senators McClure and Wallop established only that the ESA
did not expressly forbid the Secretary from preparing an impact
statement before designating critical habitat.'35 The court found a more
persuasive indication of Congress' intent in an amendment adopted later
the same day of the McClure-Wallop exchange.13 6 That amendment
required a federal agency seeking an exemption from § 1536(a)(2) to
file an EIS along with its petition to the ESC. a7
Although the Catron court examined the legislative history of the
ESA, 3 it did not make a similar inquiry into the background of NEPA.
The Pacific Legal Foundation court did examine NEPA's legislative
history and found that Congress did not intend for NEPA to apply to
federal agencies "whose function was to protect the environment."'3
The Pacific Legal Foundation court also found that the ESA, which was
enacted three years after NEPA, did not even mention NEPA or the
requirements of an environmental assessment. '4
The legislative history of NEPA shows that some congressmen
worried that NEPA would interfere with federal environmental
agencies. 4 ' Prior to adopting NEPA, some senators expressed concern
with the effect that the proposed Act would have on the federal agencies
charged with protecting the environment. 142 However, Senator Muskie
assured those who expressed such concerns that NEPA was not
designed to impose additional procedures upon environmental
agencies. 143 Later that day, in response to several specific questions
regarding the possible effects of NEPA on environmental agencies (such
as the Federal Water Pollution Control Agency), Senator Muskie again
asserted that NEPA would not encumber environmental agencies with
'3" Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 840 (6th Cir. 1981).
13 Id.
137 Id.
133 Catron, 75 F.3d at 1439.
"3' Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 838 ("Though not without ambiguity, the legislative
history suggests that NEPA was not intended to be applied to agencies whose function was to
protect the environment.").
"4 Id. at 838-39.
41 115 CONG. REc. 40,415 (1969).
141 Id.
141 115 CONG. REC. 40,415 (1969) (statement of Senator Muskie ("Many existing agencies
have important responsibilities in the area of environmental control. The provisions of [NEPAl
section 102 (as well as 103) are not designed to result in any change in the manner in which they
carry out their environmental protection authority.").
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additional responsibilities.'" The Pacific Legal Foundation court found
additional support for the contention that Congress did not intend for
NEPA to affect environmental agencies in Representative Dingell's
supporting statements made just two days after Senator Muskie's
defense of the proposed Act.'45
Congress could have amended NEPA, expressly listing those
federal agencies which must comply with NEPA and those which are
excluded from NEPA's requirements or expressly listing all federal
agency actions which constitute "major federal actions" for the purposes
of NEPA. However, Congress regularly mandates new federal agency
procedures, and Congress also creates new federal agencies from time
to time. If NEPA contained such a list, Congress would have to amend
the Act each time it mandated a new procedure or created a new
executive agency to insure that the requirements of NEPA would apply
to the new procedures or to the agency. Perhaps Congress did not want
to risk amending NEPA more often than absolutely necessary, since
every opportunity to amend a law also affords those who originally
opposed the law the opportunity to significantly alter, or even repeal the
law.
C. The Catron Decision And Its Possible Results
It is likely that the U.S. Department of Justice will apply to the
Supreme Court for review of the Catron decision. The Court is likely
to grant certiorari to review the decision, because three circuit courts
have rendered differing decisions regarding the application of NEPA to
the ESA. In the 1982 case of Pacific Legal Foundation, the Sixth
Circuit held that the Secretary of the Interior did not have to prepare an
EIS when listing endangered species in accordance with the require-
ments of the ESA.'" In Douglas County, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Secretary is not required to prepare an EIS when designating critical
habitat.'47 Finally, in the present case, the Tenth Circuit Catron court
held that the Secretary of the Interior must comply with NEPA by filing
an EA whenever he designates critical habitat under the ESA, if such
action is a major federal action with a significant affect on the human
" Id. at 40,425 (statement of Senator Muskie) ("Of course this legislation does not impose
*a responsibility oran obligation on those environmental impact agencies to make final decisions
with respect to the nature and extent of the environmental impact of their activities.").
"' Pacific Legal Found, 657 F.2d at 840 ("'he provisions of§§ 102 and 103 of the bill 'are
not designed to result in any change in the manner in which [environment-enhancing agencies]
carry out their environmental protection."').
'4 Id. at 841.
14' Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
698 (1996).
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environment. 41 When circuit courts disagree in this manner about the
application of the same federal law, the Supreme Court should provide
a resolution for the sake of fair and equitable jurisprudence.149
If the Court does grant review of Catron, the Justices will be
guided by the Court's own precedents in United States v. SCRAP and
Flint Ridge. In those decisions, the Court held that NEPA serves a
secondary role to other legislation, and that in conflicts between NEPA
and other federal laws, the latter should prevail. If, based upon those
cases and the facts of Catron, the Court overturns the Catron decision,
the Court should delineate some guidelines to help federal agencies
distinguish between those federal actions that trigger the requirements
of NEPA and those environmental actions that do not.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Catron presents a confounding
problem for federal environmental agencies such as the Department of
the Interior and the EPA. The decision breaks with the preceding line
of cases, in both the U.S. circuit courts and the Supreme Court, which
declared that NEPA does not apply to actions by federal agencies
involving the protection of endangered species under the ESA. 150
However, there are very few situations in which a federal environmental
agency's actions could result in a detrimental impact upon the physical
environment. Therefore, the opportunities for future applications of the
Catron holding are likely to be extremely limited. Jurisdictions outside
the Tenth Circuit may find the Catron decision difficult to apply,
because the Catron court did not fully discuss the factors of the county's
case which it considered to be most persuasive. Neither did the court
adequately explain how it established a nexus between the Secretary's
designation of critical habitat and the property damage the county
claimed would likely result from that federal agency action.
The county has not as of yet suffered any physical injury as a
result of the Secretary's designation of critical habitat in Catron County,
' Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N. M. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d
1429,1439 (10th Cit. 1996).
' See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Langenkamp
v. C.A. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990); Pryba v. United States, 498 U.S. 924 (1990); Mallard v. United
States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); and California Dep't of Corrections v. United
States, 465 U.S. 1070 (1984).
~ See Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d 829; Douglas County, 48 F.3d 1495; Merrell v.




New Mexico.15' Given the statutory construction of the ESA, the flood
damage that the county fears will occur because of the Secretary's
designation of critical habitat will occur in fact only if two additional
agency actions take place. First, if the Secretary fails to secure an
agreement with the federal agency which controls Catron County's
flood controls to mitigate the habitat-damaging effects of the flood
control processes, the Secretary may order the flood controls shut down.
Second, if the Secretary and the flood control agency cannot reach an
agreement to mitigate the flood plan to protect the species and the
critical habitat, the flood control agency may appeal the Secretary's
final decision to the Endangered Species Committee.'52 If the seven-
member ESC upholds the Secretary's decision, the Secretary may order
the flood controls to close. If, however, the ESC overrules the Secretary
the flood control agency will be free to proceed with its normal
operations, and the plaintiff county's injury will not occur. Thus, the
court's grant of the plaintiff's standing to sue in Catron was, at best,
questionable.
Unfortunately, the statutory construction of the ESA did not serve
its intended purpose to prevent the type of conflict which occurred in
Catron. Hopefully, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari to review
Catron, the Justices will structure a ruling that will guide the Secretary
of the Interior and those affected by his actions under the ESA to
resolve their competing interests through the administrative process
which Congress established in the 1978 ESA Amendments. Over the
past several years, the balance of power in the United States federal
system has shifted in favor of the states. Alternative methods of dispute
resolution, such as the consultation requirements of the ESA and the
ESC appeal process, will help insure that conflicts between the federal
government and the states regarding the designation of critical habitat
will not prevent the nation from protecting and preserving its most
endangered species.
NEPA serves a vital national interest by forcing federal agencies
to take a "hard look" at their actions with regard to the detrimental
effects they may have on the environment. Forcing environmental
agencies to perform the same sort of evaluations may prove beneficial
to those agencies and the environment by preventing undesired
environmental degradation from actions which are otherwise intended
" See generally Catron, 75 F.3d 1429.
W2 hen Congress amended the ESA in 1978, it established the Endangered Species
Committee, (a seven-member, quasi-legislative body), to serve as an adjudicative body to resolve
conflicts between human economic values-such as the property damage claimed by Catron
County-and the value of fulfilling the purposes of the Endangered Species Act by protecting and
preserving the nation's endangered species for the next generation.
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to protect the environment. Forcing environmental agencies such as
EPA and the Department of the Interior to perform EISs on a regular
basis may also provide a mechanism by which those environmental
agencies can become more familiar with the practical difficulties other
agencies encounter in preparing their own EISs, which may lead to
better regulations and a more cooperative atmosphere throughout the
entire environmental regulatory community. However, such relational
benefits must not come at the cost of environmental losses.
The federal agencies charged with protecting the nation's
environment must have the ability to respond quickly and effectively to
environmental problems. Forcing such agencies to prepare EISs prior
to taking any action intended to protect the environment may needlessly
delay environmental protection efforts, where otherwise swift agency
action could prevent environmental damage or contain environmental
damage already done. Congress never intended the requirements of
NEPA to prevent federal environmental agencies from performing their
duties. Therefore, the courts should lend no credence to an interpreta-
tion of NEPA that subverts its basic goals of protecting and preserving
the nation's environment.
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